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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the potential that the natural sciences of complexity may have to 
offer analogies and insights with regard to communicative processes in a group and 
the concept of the group matrix. The paper briefly reviews Foulkes’ last formulation 
of the concept of the group matrix. It then draws on Mead’s thought on mind, self and 
society, and on some analogies from the complexity sciences, to suggest a 
formulation of the emergence of mind in communicative interaction in a group. 
  
 
In his last paper on the group matrix, Foulkes (1973) says of a group-analytic group: 
 
What an enormous complexity of processes and actions and 
interactions play between even two or three of these people, or these 
people and myself, or between two in relation to another three, and so 
on. What enormous complexity, quite impossible to perceive and 
disentangle even theoretically all at the same time. How is it that they 
can nevertheless understand each other, that they can to some extent 
refer to a shared common sense of what is going on? (1973, p227)  
 
His answer to this question is ‘the existence of a suprapersonal matrix’ (1973, p227). 
He sees this as an alterative to the view that what is happening in a group is due to 
the interaction of individual minds. He makes it clear (1973, p226) that he is talking 
about a psychic system, one of interacting mental processes, not individuals 
interacting to form a superimposed social system. 
 
 
Communication and the group matrix as suprapersonal psychic system 
  
According to Foulkes, when people come together in a group they create a new 
phenomenon, a suprapersonal psychic system, which Foulkes describes in a 
number of different ways as: the context of the group, that is, the background in 
which the individual is figural (1973, p230); a total unified field of mental happenings 
of which the individual is a part (1971, p214); transpersonal processes that go right 
through individuals like X Rays, but which those individuals can modify, elaborate 
and contribute to in their own way (1973, p229); interacting mental processes that 
transgress the individual (1973, p229). By mental processes, he seems to mean 
communications such as ‘acts, active messages, movements, expressions, silent 
transmissions of moods …’ (1973, p213) both conscious and unconscious. In the 
latter category he includes resonance, transference, projection, and so on. 
Although earlier he had talked about the matrix as a group mind, in his last 
paper on the matrix he rejected that terminology and talked about ‘the mind’ as 
interacting transpersonal mental process, or ‘mind’ as a multiperson phenomenon 
(1971, p225). As I understand it, he is saying that an individual mind is the 
transpersonal processes that penetrate him or her through and through to the core 
so that individual mind is a multiperson phenomenon. This dynamic formulation 
begins to suggest a view of causality in which interaction is perpetually constructing 
the future when in their coming together people create the new phenomena of 
 
 3 
suprapersonal psychic systems. This conceptualisation of mind is surely a significant 
departure from classical psychoanalytic formulations in which mind is located in the 
individual. Foulkes’ view had its critics (for example, van der Kleij, 1982) who felt that 
it either removed the individual altogether or presented a picture removed from the 
ordinary experience of individuality. 
However, Foulkes repeatedly argued that he was not removing or reducing 
the individual because, as I understand it, part of the psychic suprasystem consists 
of the foundation matrix that individuals bring with them to the group. In my view, this 
development of his argument takes him right back to locating the mind in the 
individual in the way that classical psychoanalytic theory does. My argument here is 
essentially the same as Dalal’s (1998) broader analysis of Foulkes’ thought. To see 
what I mean, consider the steps in Foulkes’ argument. First, he defines the nature of 
the suprapersonal psychic system as follows: 
 
…… I have accepted from the beginning that even this group of total 
strangers, being of the same species and more narrowly of the same 
culture, share a fundamental, mental matrix (foundation matrix).  To 
this their closer acquaintance and their intimate exchanges add 
consistently, so that they also form a current, ever-moving, ever-
developing dynamic matrix. (1973 p228) 
 
This pre-existing and relatively static part we call the ‘foundation 
matrix’. On top of this there are various levels of communication which 
are increasingly dynamic. They develop under our eyes. This is called 
the ‘dynamic matrix’. (1971 p213) 
 
He makes it clear that the various levels of matrix in the suprasystem operate 
at the same time in various admixtures but says that for reasons of clarity one can 
distinguish between the 
 
……. relatively static and unalterable genetic foundation matrix and the 
rest, which is, to a greater or lesser extent, subject to change within the 
group-analytic group. (1971, p213). 
 
Of course, the foundation matrix changes through biological and cultural 
evolution but such evolution takes a long time. It seems clear to me from these 
quotes, that as far as a specific group-analytic group is concerned, the theory 
postulates a suprapersonal psychic system having stable, static aspects and 
dynamic ever-changing ones, to be thought of as intertwined with each other as 
interacting mental processes. However, there has been an important shift in the 
argument in the way in which the relatively static processes called the foundation 
matrix are linked to genetics. Foulkes confirms this shift when he says that mental 
processes cannot interact per se because it is ultimately whole persons who interact 
with whole persons: 
 
What I mean by saying that mental processes interact is the selective 
interaction that goes on impersonally, instinctively, intuitively, basically 
unconsciously, in accordance with the inner constellation and 
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predispositions of those concerned and which determine their 
interaction. ….. The total interactions of the individuals are in fact the 
result of affinities or disaffinities of individual instincts, emotions, 
reactions of all sorts, character predispositions, for example. There is 
at the same time an unconscious interpretation of these reactions on 
the same basis. (1973, p228-9) 
 
…. The  individual’s behaviour has been decisively shaped by the 
original family group. (1973, p231) 
 
Through the notion of the foundation matrix, Foulkes has brought the 
individual back to the central position because now mental processes interact in a 
way determined by instincts, predispositions and inner constellations and decisively 
shaped by early family life. This determination and decisive shaping clearly refers to 
the individual mind. Instincts, predispositions, and so on, constitute causative factors 
operative before the individual comes to a group to create the new phenomenon of 
the suprapersonal psychic system. In fact, if their minds are determined and 
decisively shaped in the way just described, what is the causative role of this newly 
created suprasystem of transpersonal processes that pass through individuals?  The 
argument has moved from a dynamic multiperson interactive process in the living 
present that is potentially constructing the future to one in which the future is the 
unfolding of individually enfolded instincts, predispositions and unconscious inner 
constellations. How these two are to be understood as processes in one newly 
constructed suprasystem is far from clear. Despite Foulkes’ insistence that the notion 
of the individual is retained, it is retained in what seems to me to be unconvincing 
ways, either as transpersonal processes passing through an individual, or as the 
unfolding of instinctual and culturally determined behaviour, or by both in some way 
not made clear. 
For me, the notions of a psychic suprasystem, on the one hand, and the 
foundations of inherited instincts and early predispositions, on the other, are two 
mutually inconsistent explanations in a number of ways. One privileges the group as 
a psychic system transgressing the individuals and the other privileges the 
genetically / culturally determined individuals as constructing the group. One implies 
transformative causality in which the future is being constructed in the living present 
while the other implies a formative causality in which the future is unfolded from what 
is already there. One emphasises the possibility of the unknown and the other the 
likelihood of the known. 
However, in his insistence that the total psychic suprasystem must be 
understood as one intertwined system consisting of foundation and dynamic 
matrices, Foulkes ends up with a ‘both / and’ explanation. On the one hand, there is 
the dynamic matrix understood as a jointly created suprasystem, above or across 
individuals, penetrating or transgressing them as their minds. This is a multipersonal 
phenomenon and thus a notion very different to classical psychoanalytic theory. On 
the other hand, there is the foundation matrix, suggesting something below or before 
individuals, which is explained in terms of biological determinism and decisive 
shaping by early family experience, fully in accord with classical psychoanalytic 
theory of mind as a single person phenomenon. Foulkes does not choose between 
these explanations but quite explicitly states his ‘both / and’ position (pp227, 230-1). 
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He argues that, against the background of the total field, one can focus on the group 
as a whole or on the individual, in which latter case psychoanalytic formulations 
apply. It all depends upon what one wishes to observe. He sees both as abstractions 
in terms of figure (group, individual) and ground (total field or psychic suprasystem) 
and regards both as being true from the position from which the observation is made. 
However, he does express a preference for the multiperson view of mind (p1973, 
p227).  
 For me, this is an unsatisfactory position that diminishes Foulkes’ important 
insight about the centrality of relating and communicating between people in 
understanding the nature of the group and the individual. It also diminishes his 
insights about the arbitrariness of defining some processes as inside the individual 
and others as outside. Simply accepting both positions, it seems to me, is an easy 
way out of having to live with the paradox of the individual and the group. Foulkes’ 
explanation provides the relief of retaining two contradictory theories by looking at 
them sequentially, keeping one for one purpose and one for another. In so doing, the 
theory loses the dialectic, the paradox of groups and individuals simultaneously 
forming and being formed by each in communicative processes. A similar point was 
made by Van der Kleij (1982), who also criticised the conceptualisation of individuals 
as nodes in a matrix, through whom transpersonal processes passed. He proposed 
a ‘dialectical’ formulation in which attention moves back and forth between individual 
and group, which in the end is not much different to Foulkes because it too is a ‘both 
/and’ sequence rather than the paradox, or dialectic, of behaviour as simultaneously 
individual and group. 
I want to suggest a way of understanding the relationship between individual 
and group not in terms of systems above or below people but as processes of a 
paradoxical nature in which, in their communicative interaction, individuals form 
groups and are formed by them simultaneously. I want to suggest that this approach 
might be a way to develop Foulkes’ important insight on the centrality of 
communication in a way that focuses on the communicative interaction between 
individuals rather than the interaction between mental processes in a psychic 
suprasystem.  The approach I am suggesting draws on the thought of Mead about 
mind, self and society and upon some analogies provided by the natural sciences of 
complexity.
 
 
Mead on Mind, Self and Society 
 
Mead (1934) argued that all social animals communicate with each other through a 
conversation of gestures: movement, touch, sound, visual display and odour. Each 
gesture by one animal calls forth a response from another and together, gesture and 
response constitute a social act, that is, an act that is meaningful to those gesturing 
and responding. This is what the social, in general terms means to him: responsive 
processes in which animals communicate meaningfully with each in a continuous 
cycle of cooperative interaction with each other. 
However, although there is meaning in such a process, there may be no mind 
or consciousness. Mind is a process in which a gesture can call forth the same 
bodily response in the one making it as in the one to whom it is made. It is only 
through the capacity that the one making a gesture has to call forth in him / herself a 
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similar attitude to that being called forth in the other, that the maker of a gesture can 
be aware of what it means. For example, this capacity enables one to be aware that 
the gesture of shouting at someone may arouse fear or anger in that someone. That 
awareness is possible because the gesture of shouting arouses the potential of fear 
or anger in oneself. Such a gesture is what Mead called a significant symbol. It is 
significant because it means the same thing, in a bodily sense, to the maker of the 
gesture and to the recipient. 
Mead, like Foulkes, is concerned with the nature of communication in a group 
but his formulation suggests another answer to the question posed by Foulkes in the 
quotation at the beginning of this paper: how is it that strangers coming together in a 
group can immediately understand each other? Foulkes’ answer is the foundation 
matrix but Mead’s is the biological capacity to call forth in oneself a similar attitude to 
one’s gesture as that called forth in the other. The role of the biological here is 
completely different. Biology is not acting as a causal determinant in the form of 
instinct but as a capacity, namely, the capacity to relate to others in a particular way. 
Instead of having to posit the existence of a psychic suprasystem it is enough that 
humans have central nervous systems enabling them to communicate in significant 
symbols. This is an explanation based on experience-near communicative 
interaction, not on an hypothesised psychic system above, across, beneath or 
behind those communicating. 
For Mead, the elaboration of vocal gestures into language enables a more 
sophisticated development of mind. Language enables the maker of a gesture to be 
aware, in advance, of the likely response of the recipient and it enables the maker of 
the gesture to signal to the recipient how the act is likely to unfold. The maker of the 
gesture is, thus, conscious and can think, that is, hypothesise likely responses to a 
gesture in a kind of role-play. To have a mind means to be aware of the possible 
consequences of actions, as those actions emerge, by means of silently conducted 
conversations in the pauses between gestures and responses. Mind is silent, private 
role-playing of gesture-response conducted during the vocal, public interaction of 
gesture-response that is social cooperation (for similar views see Elias, 1970, 1989; 
Bhaktin, 1962; Vygotsky, 1986). This is a view of individuals in relationship 
continuously evoking and provoking responses in each other, responses that each 
paradoxically also selects and chooses on the basis of their previous histories of 
interaction. The private, silent conversation of a body with itself is the same process 
as public, vocal conversation between bodies and in this sense mind is always a 
social process even though it is an individual conducting the private silent 
conversation. This is, an experience-near interpretation of what it means to say that 
the individual is social through and through to the core, one that does not require the 
postulate of a psychic suprasystem. Mead’s theory of mind is firmly linked to the 
body because mind as silent conversation of gestures requires a living, biological 
body. The conversation involves more than words; it is always interwoven with 
feelings and direct communication between bodies in the medium of feelings, a point 
Foulkes clearly makes in his notion of resonance. 
The individual mind is then logically the same process as social relating, in 
that both are cooperative communicative interactions of living bodies. The only 
difference is that one is silent and private while the other is vocal and public. It is 
impossible to have a mind in advance of vocal, public interaction, just as it is 
impossible to have that vocal, public interaction, that sophisticated human social 
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cooperation, in the absence of minds. Neither form of conversation is primary or prior 
to the other. They must both arise together, simultaneously. This immediately 
renders problematic the labelling of one as more or less fundamental and suggests 
that the individual and the social are at one level of explanation, not two. This is also 
Elias’ view (1989) who said that the individual was the singular of relating and the 
group the plural. Meaning is not something that is going on in a mind as thought 
before action but, rather, arises, and continually re-arises, in the conversation of 
gestures, in the action and interaction, through social relationships conducted in 
significant symbols. There is no need to postulate a separate psychic or social level, 
or any kind of transpersonal processes, or any notion of a group mind. 
Mead takes the argument a step further with his concept of the generalised 
other. By this he means that one does not simply call forth in oneself the attitude to 
one’s gesture of a particular other but comes to call forth in oneself the collective 
attitude towards one’s gesture. In other words, in the private role play of silent 
conversation the attitude of one’s group towards one’s actions finds a voice. This is a 
social form of control, arising simultaneously in the group and the individual. 
Mead then goes further to suggest what it means to be self-conscious. One is 
self-conscious when, as a subject, one becomes an object to oneself. To be an 
object to him / herself, an individual must experience him / herself from the 
standpoint of others; he or she must talk to him / herself as others talk to him or her. 
This happens as an individual learns to take up the roles of others to him / herself, as 
a unique identity, in a form of role-play with him / herself. The silent conversation 
then involves a ‘me’, that is, an identity, which is the attitude of one’s group towards 
oneself. The individual’s response to this ‘me’, is the ‘I’, that is, the action that an 
individual takes in response to the perceived community view of him / herself. The ‘I’ 
response is potentially novel and hence unpredictable. The ‘I’ response has the 
potential to change others, opening up the way for simultaneous individual / group 
evolution. 
In this process, an individual takes the attitude of the whole community 
towards him / herself, as well as the attitude of individual others towards him / herself 
and the attitude of others towards each other. It is through this process that 
individual and community display controlled cooperative behaviour. This 
sophisticated human social process is possible only in language. It follows that the 
self is a social construction emerging in relationships with others and only animals 
that possess language can possess a self that they are aware of. Mind and self do 
not emerge out of a clash between something that is already there in the individual 
and social constraint as in the classical Freudian view. Mind and self emerge in 
social relationships. Individuals are forming and being formed by the group at the 
same time. Mind and self arise between people rather than being located in an 
individual. Change in the group and in the individual is the same process, namely, 
change in patterns of communicative interaction. An individual changes when his / 
her private role play / silent conversation with him / herself changes. 
 However, if there is no psychic or other system above, below or behind the 
ongoing flow of communicative interaction between bodies in the living present, just 
what is it that imparts pattern, or coherence to that communicative interaction? Mead 
did not address this question and it is here that insights from the natural complexity 
sciences (see Waldorp,1992; Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2001) developed over the last 
few decades have, I believe, some important analogies to offer.  
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Analogies from the natural sciences of complexity 
 
Natural complexity scientists (for example, Goodwin, 1994; Kauffman, 1995; Allen, 
1998a, 1998b; Prigogine, 1997) are very much concerned with the question I have 
just posed. They are interested in explaining how vast numbers of interactions 
between entities in nature can produce coherence in the absence of any blueprint or 
programme determining that coherence. Very briefly, the kind of explanation many 
are working with is this. Vast numbers of entities, such as the neurones in a brain or 
ants in a colony, interact with each other according to their own local principles of 
interaction, that is, they self organise. In certain conditions of a paradoxical nature, 
sometimes called the edge of chaos, and sometimes called complexity, this kind of 
self organisation displays the capacity to produce emergent coherence that none of 
the entities ‘intended’ or ‘knew about in advance’. Emergence is, thus a different 
notion of causality, one that does not depend upon a blueprint or any system outside 
of interaction itself. In other words, emergent coherence is not due to anything 
above, below, behind or anywhere else. Emergence is coherence arising in the 
interaction itself. By analogy, it seems to me to be quite plausible to argue that 
human interaction also has intrinsic pattern forming properties. It follows that Mead’s 
concept of continuing social acts as gestures-responses has intrinsic pattern forming 
capacities, making it superfluous to postulate any kind of psychic suprasystem. 
Note at this point that complexity here is a theoretical construct, sometimes 
specifically meaning a paradoxical dynamic of stability and instability at the same 
time and sometimes referring to a collection of other constructs to do with self 
organization and emergence. Clearly, in the quotation at the beginning of this 
chapter, Foulkes was using the word complex as a descriptive adjective, not a 
theoretical construct. Notions of self organisation and emergence, therefore, offer an 
alternative way of understanding Foulkes’ insight about the importance of 
communicative processes in a group. The following paragraphs briefly outline some 
of the theorising of Prigogine, based on his work in chemistry and other areas. For 
me, they are suggestive of how one might think about human groups. 
At the beginning of his book called The End of Certainty, Prigogine poses 
what he sees as a central question: ‘Is the future given, or is it under perpetual 
construction?’ (1997). His answer to the question is clear: he sees the future for 
every level of the universe as under perpetual construction. He says that nature is 
about the creation of unpredictable novelty where the possible is richer than the real. 
For him life is an unstable system with an unknowable future and human creativity is 
essentially the same process as nature’s creativity. Central to Prigogine’s approach, 
at all levels, is the distinction between individual entities and populations, or 
ensembles, consisting of those entities. Prigogine takes the ensemble as 
fundamental and argues that change in whole ensembles emerges over long periods 
through the amplification of slight variations in individual entities, that is, the 
variability of individuals in the case of organisms or microscopic collisions in the case 
of matter. It is this variability that is amplified to reach bifurcation points where a 
system spontaneously self organises to take completely unpredictable paths into the 
future. Self organisation is the process in which a system ‘chooses’ a path at a 
bifurcation point as a result of individual variability, or fluctuations. Prigogine is 
 
 9 
arguing, therefore, that even at the most fundamental levels of matter, it is the 
individual variability of entities and the interactions between them that lead to 
emergent change in populations or ensembles. He sees this process as extending to 
every level including that of human action. 
 The possibility of the evolution of novelty depends critically on the presence of 
microscopic diversity. When individual entities are the same, that is, when they do 
not have any incentive to alter their patterns of interacting with each other, there is 
only stability. When individual entities are different and thus do have incentives to 
change their patterns of interaction with each other, they display rapid change of a 
genuinely novel kind. The ‘openness’ of the individual entities to the possible leads to 
a continuing dialogue between novel individual ‘experiments’ and (almost certainly) 
unanticipated collective effects.  Here, the future is under perpetual construction 
through the micro interactions of diverse entities. The ‘final’ form towards which a 
phenomenon moves is not given beforehand, nor is it being ‘chosen’ from outside. 
The forms continually emerge in an unpredictable way as movement into the 
unknown. However, there is nothing mysterious or esoteric about this. What 
emerges does so because of the transformative cause of the process of the micro 
interactions, the fluctuations themselves. 
  What emerges, then, is always potentially transformed identity: the identities 
of the whole and of the entities constituting it at the same time. And therefore, the 
differences between the entities themselves, and their collective difference from 
other wholes, also emerge at the same time. Micro interactions transform 
themselves in a paradox of forming while being formed and an explanation of what is 
happening requires an understanding of these micro interactions (Stacey, Griffin & 
Shaw, 20001). 
Mead’s explanation of mind self and society is a similar expression of this 
view of causality, one in which the process of interaction between biological bodies is 
the transformative cause of that interaction. In this explanation, it is in the detailed 
interaction between people, their ongoing choices and actions in their relating to 
each other, that their minds and selves arise. They arise as patterns that display 
both continuity and potential transformation. At the same time, the social, the 
cooperative interaction of humans, is also formed as continuity and transformation. 
The movement here is paradoxical in that it is both continuity and transformation at 
the same time, the known and the unknown at the same time, the individual and the 
social at the same time, that all arise in the micro detail of interaction. 
This means that there is no need to postulate a suprasystem or to posit a 
foundation matrix that unfolds what is already unfolded. Human communicative 
interaction could have the intrinsic capacity to pattern itself and Mead suggests how 
this might actually happen in an account based entirely on communicative interaction 
itself. I now want to turn to more recent studies of human relating that seem to me to 
point to the transformative potential of communicative interaction between people. 
 
 
Developing the notion of the the group matrix as process 
 
Using detailed research on infant behaviour, Stern (1985; 1995) explains how an 
infant’s self emerges in the mutual relationships between her and her family 
members. In effect he presents a family as an evolving process in which family 
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members relate to each other in accordance with principles that organise their 
experience. Stern calls these organising principles schemas-of-being with: 
 
 1. A schema-of-being-with is based on the interactive experience of being-
with a particular person in a specific way, such as being hungry and awaiting 
the breast or bottle or soliciting a smile and getting no response. ….. a way 
that is repetitive in ordinary life. 
 2. A representation-of-being-with is a network of many specific schemas-of-
being-with that are tied together by a common theme or feature. Activities that 
are organized by one motivational system are frequently the common theme  - 
for example, feeding, playing, or separation. Other representations are 
organized around affect experiences: they might be networks of schemas-of-
being-sad-with or happy with, for example. Yet other representations are 
assemblies made up of many representations that share a commonality such 
as person (all the networks that go with a specific person) or place or role. 
Stern, 1995, pp19-20) 
 
Stern is here describing an individual psyche in terms that are quite consistent 
with the functioning of the brain. Just as neurones trigger other neurones, so one 
schema-of-being with triggers others. Although he uses the terminology of 
representations, which may be problematic, he is postulating that the psyche is a 
process of interacting schemas rather than some mental apparatus or psychic 
system above them. He describes how an infant’s schemas-of-being-with evolve in 
the interactive experience with the mother and the father and other family members 
and how an infant self emerges in this evolution. He talks about how the mother has 
many schemas-of-being-with, for example, her schemas-of-being-with her infant, her 
mother, her husband, herself, and about how they interact with her infant’s schemas-
of-being-with her. He illustrates in some detail how both the normal and the 
pathological development of a personality emerge from the continuous interaction 
between all of these schemas-of-being-with and how indeed the infant’s arrival 
contributes to the further evolution, normal and pathological, of all other family 
members’ schemas-of-being-with. Although he does not use the terminology of 
complexity theory, it seems to me that he is describing complex processes in which 
each family member’s relational schemas are interacting with those of others to 
producing emergent patterns of family relationship (the group) that constitute the 
further evolution of their relational schemas (individual minds). These relational 
schemas are continuously replicated or recreated and as this happens there is the 
possibility of novel emergent relational patterns. 
Those writing from an intersubjective psychoanalytic perspective adopt a 
similar formulation (Stolorow, Atwood & Brandchaft, 1994): 
 
... recurring patterns of intersubjective interaction within the developmental 
system result in the establishment of invariant principles that unconsciously 
organize the child’s subsequent experiences .... It is these unconscious 
ordering principles, crystallized within the matrix of the child-caregiver system, 
that form the essential building blocks of personality development .... (p5) 
 
Thus the basic units of analysis for our investigations of personality are 
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structures of experience  -  the distinctive configurations of self and other that 
shape and organize a person’s subjective world. These psychological 
structures are not to be viewed simply as “internalizations” or mental replicas 
of interpersonal events. Nor should they be regarded as having an objective 
existence in physical space or somewhere in a “mental apparatus.”  Instead, 
we conceptualize these structures as systems of ordering or organizing 
principles ....  through which a person’s experiences of self and other assume 
their characteristic forms and meanings. Such structures of subjectivity are 
disclosed in the thematic patterning of a person’s subjective life. (p23-24) 
 
Consider how the above formulations might be used to think about a therapy 
group as complex processes of communicative interaction. I want to use the term 
organising ‘theme’ rather than organising ‘principle’ or ‘schema’ because it captures 
for me the narrative and motivating nature of the process through which humans 
interactively organise their ordinary, everyday experience in narrative-like patterns 
(Bruner, 1990; Stacey 2001). Terms such as ‘principle’ and ‘schema’ convey a sense 
of propositions, or rules, and in doing so fail to be suggestive of the fluidity in the 
organisation of ordinary, everyday experience. As members of a group communicate 
with each other publicly and vocally, that is, as they act bodily toward each other, 
their interaction patterns itself in an emergent way as one communication triggers 
others. Public communicative interaction is thus being patterned as narrative themes 
patterning the experience of being together. As they communicate with each other, 
each also simultaneously engages in a private role play / silent conversation, which 
is the action of the body directed toward itself. This private communicative interaction 
is also patterning itself as personal organising themes reflecting personal histories of 
relating to others. 
These organising themes, both public and private, are not, however, to be 
thought of as constituting a suprapersonal system because they are the acts of 
bodies. Furthermore, they are not to be thought of as models or inner worlds that are 
stored in brains, waiting to be brought out of storage as it were, and shared. Some 
neuroscientists are now arguing that changes in the brain in response to stimuli are 
transient and do not last for more than a few hours (Rose, 1995) and others, working 
from a complexity perspective, argue that it is inappropriate to describe the brain as 
storing anything (Barrie et al 1994; Freeman, 1994, 195; Freeman & Schneider, 
1992; Freeman and Barrie, 1994; Skarda & Freeman 1990; Kelso, 1995). For 
example: 
 
The patterns of activity are created by dynamic neural interaction in the 
sensory cortex, not by registration and filtering of stimuli. There is no 
evidence for storage, retrieval, cross-correlation or logical tree search. 
(Freeman, 1994, p332) 
 
…….  the brain is fundamentally a pattern-forming, self-organized, 
dynamical system poised on the brink of instability. By operating near 
instability, the brain is able to switch flexibly and quickly among a large 
repertoire of spatio temporal patterns. It is, I like to say, a “twinkling” 
system, creating and annihilating patterns according to the demands 
placed on it. (Kelso, 1995, pxvii) 
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  It seems therefore to be inappropriate to think of storing psychic organising 
themes, either uniquely individual or shared with others, and more appropriate to 
think of themes triggering other themes, sometimes along routes that have become 
habitual and sometimes along novel routes. These themes are most obviously 
expressed in language, in the to and fro of ordinary conversation, but they are also 
no less importantly expressed in nonverbal cues and emotional resonance. 
So, as soon as members of a group meet each other they all actively, albeit 
largely unconsciously, select and so organise their own subjective experience of 
being in that place with those people at that time and they do this according to some 
personal organising themes formed in their own individual histories of relating. 
However, what those particular themes are at that particular moment will depend just 
as much on the cues being presented by others as upon the personal history of a 
particular individual. Each is simultaneously evoking and provoking responses from 
others so that the particular personal organising themes emerging will depend as 
much on the others as on the individual concerned. Put like this, it becomes clear 
that no one individual can be organising his or her experience in isolation because 
they are all simultaneously evoking and provoking responses in each other. Together 
they constitute intersubjective, reflexive processes of emergent themes patterning 
their experience of being together in which further themes continuously emerge. 
The group matrix can then be defined, not as a system or a network, but as 
process, that is, continuously replicating and potentially transforming patterns of 
intersubjective narrative themes that organise the experience of being together. 
These themes emerge, in variant and invariant forms, out of the interaction between 
individual group members as they pattern that very interaction. However, these 
processes are embodied. Although themes patterning the experience of being 
together emerge in the interaction between people and therefore cannot be located 
‘inside’ any individual, the experience that is being so organised is always a bodily 
experience, that is, changes, marked or subtle, in the feeling tones of those bodies.  
The following clinical material illustrates how themes organise group 
members’ experience of being together. This is an illustration, not evidence of the 
veracity of the theoretical points I have been making. I do not believe that such 
accounts could constitute evidence in any traditional scientific sense because each 
group meeting is unique and open to many different interpretations. What follows, 
then, is an illustration of the theoretical position I have been taking but you, the 
reader, may well interpret it in a completely different way. 
 
 
Clinical Illustration 
 
In a session some twenty months into the life of a group, Bill repeated a consistent 
complaint about the group not addressing feelings or members’ relationships with 
each other. As usual, Diane and Helen took his comments as a direct criticism of 
them and aggressively suggested that there was nothing stopping him from talking 
about his relationships. Fred, as usual, supported Bill and complained about not 
being able express anger in the group. Jane said that she found Bill’s long silences 
frightening and felt that he did not like her. David attacked Bill for adopting a superior 
attitude. By this time Bill had slumped back into his seat in a kind of silent, analytic 
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pose. He announced that the remarks of the others had simply confirmed what he 
already knew, namely, that people in the group did not like him. Diane said that 
occasionally she saw flashes of his personality that she liked. He replied that he did 
not care what she thought and told her that she was very self-centred. 
So, remarks by one person evoke feelings and remarks from another, which 
in turn trigger other remarks and feelings in others in a self-organising way. The 
private role play /silent conversation of each proceeds simultaneously with their 
public communicative interaction. There is an invariant and therefore largely 
predictable strand in the themes that emerged here as continuity with the past. On 
many occasions before, Freda, Helen or Diane would recount some difficulty they 
were having and this would evoke complaints from either or both of Bill and Fred that 
feelings were not being expressed. This would be denied and taken as a criticism. 
However, the particular form this sequence would take and when it would occur was 
quite unpredictable: there was always the potential for transformation. Also, the 
communicative process organising itself as themes of being together does not mean 
that all share the same theme. Each member is responding differently around a 
theme that has to do with dissatisfaction with the group and each other, of being 
liked or not liked. For example, Jane is organising Bill’s silence into an experience of 
not being liked while Diane organises her experience of Bill’s remarks into a criticism 
of her. Bill organises whatever they all say or do as further confirmation of their not 
liking him. 
I am suggesting that group communication is processes patterned as many 
themes that organise the experience of being together in the group. These 
interacting themes are simultaneously arising between people and being 
experienced in their individual bodies. Thus, in the case given above, Bill’s remark 
about people in the group being considerate is evoked by Diane’s prior comment and 
his remark in turn evokes a statement from her. But, as he makes his remark he 
slumps in his chair while she stiffens in hers signalling her apprehension. Even 
where there is no apparent change in posture I am suggesting that there will always 
be subtle changes in body rhythms as changes in feeling states accompany the 
emergent themes organising experience. Communicative interaction is self-
organising as emergent pattern in itself. These patterns are changes in the themes 
organising local interaction as group members seek to fit in with each other in some 
way. These organising themes are continually re-creating themselves in a self-
reflexive way as people continuously experience the changes in their bodies. Note 
how the explanation runs entirely in terms of communicative interaction, having 
conscious and unconscious aspects, in a way that does not require any notion of a 
suprasystem or transpersonal processes. The explanation is action based with 
nothing behind, above or below the action itself. 
 
 
Paying attention to themes organising the experience of being together 
 
From the perspective I am suggesting, the group conductor seeks to understand the 
group in terms of his or her perceptions, feelings about, and resonance with, the 
emerging themes organising the experience of being together. As a participant in the 
construction of these themes, the group conductor may articulate some of those 
themes, particularly those that the group members seem unconscious of, in the 
 
 14 
interest of assisting the group to take the next step. In the Foulkesian tradition the 
conductor seeks to facilitate communication, particularly when it is stuck in repetitive 
patterns or when the group’s pathology is located in one of its members. 
Here again I find an analogy from the complexity sciences helpful. Complex 
systems generally display three classes of dynamic. In some conditions the system 
dynamic takes the form of repetitive patterns of regular predictability. In other 
conditions, the same system displays patterns of randomness and disintegration. But 
at intermediate conditions between those producing regularity and those producing 
disintegration, the system displays the dynamic known as the edge of chaos, or what 
others call complexity. Here the system dynamic is paradoxically patterned as 
stability and instability at the same time. Researchers have shown that the healthy 
heart functions in the dynamic at the edge of chaos and that disease is the loss of 
complexity (Golberger, 1997). This, it seems to me, is analogous to Foulkes notion of 
a healthy group as one characterised by free flowing communication while the 
unhealthy group is one that loses this ‘complexity’ and gets stuck in repetitive 
interactions. 
There is another implication too. If an individual mind is thought of as a private 
role play or silent conversation, then it is useful to ask group members to recount 
what they say to themselves, particularly when they are depressed, about to panic, 
or experiencing other distressing moments. I have found that this question is 
immediately understood by group members and elicits useful material that seems to 
move the member forward in the sense of participating more fully in the group. The 
aim is to encourage shifts in patterns of silent conversation, to introduce new voices 
and greater variety into silent conversation with oneself, as relief from the repetitive 
silent conversations of mental distress.    
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has argued that the group matrix is not a system but processes of 
interaction in which intersubjective narrative themes pattern the members’ embodied 
experience of being together. I have suggested that these are self-organising 
processes that emergently re-produce themselves as bodily actions, always with the 
potential for transformation. In other words, themes produce further emergent 
themes patterning the experience of being together in potentially transformative 
ways.  
From a complexity perspective there is no need to postulate a suprapersonal 
psychic system or any transpersonal processes. Nor is there any need to postulate 
an individual mental apparatus. Instead there is a notion of psychic phenomena as 
emergent narrative themes that form while being formed by patterns of 
communicative interaction between human bodies. 
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